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Wang Lixiong, an atypical
intellectual
The author of the novel Huanghuo, highly critical of the Peking regime,
carries on his activities inside China
Rémi Quesnel
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 Wang Lixiong, author of the well-known political novel, Huanghuo (Yellow Peril), which
appeared in the early 1990s, occupies a unique place in the Chinese intellectual world.
He expresses himself in a way which is highly critical of the regime in Peking, while
carrying on his activities inside China, rather than abroad as is the case with some
dissidents.  Wang Lixiong made a name for himself by writing novels,  but he is also
active  in  Chinese  environmental  protection  circles  and  has  produced  studies  of
sensitive problems such as the nationalities question. He is also the webmaster of a site
dedicated to what he calls “democracy by stages”1.
2 It may seem surprising that Wang Lixiong carries on his activities in mainland China.
How come he is tolerated? When does someone overstep the mark? Before answering
these  questions,  we  propose  an  overall  view of  Wang Lixiong’s  intellectual  output,
which  is  not  widely  translated  and  is  therefore  little  known  in  the  West.  We  will
attempt  to  define  his  approach  and  the  way  in  which  he  envisages  his  role  as  an
intellectual.
A diverse intellectual output
3 Wang Lixiong was born in 1953 in Changchun in Manchuria, and now lives in Peking.
Sent away for re-education during the Cultural Revolution, he began to write poetry. At
the end of the Cultural Revolution, after studying automobile mechanics, he worked in
car factories in Manchuria and in Wuhan. He became interested in political thought
early on, and formulated the idea of an “electoral system by stages” by 1975. In 1978,
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Wang participated in the Wall of Democracy movement and published his first short
story in the magazine Jintian (Today). In 1980, he left the Wuhan car factory and devoted
himself to literary creation as an independent. He wrote film scripts and published his
first novel in 1983. In 1984 he floated down 1,200 kilometers of the Yellow River on a
raft  made from the inner  tubes  of  truck tyres,  passing through areas  inhabited by
Tibetans, which got him interested in the Tibetan question. He joined the Association of
Chinese Writers in 1988, and in the same year began to write the political fiction novel
Yellow Peril 2, which was to be a resounding success. 
4 From 1991 to 1994, he wrote a book of political theory, Rongjie quanli—Zhuceng dixuan zhi
(Distribution of Power—An Electoral System by Stages), in which he took a position in favour
democratic  reforms  in  China.  In  1994,  Wang  launched  with  some  others  a  non-
governmental organisation (NGO) for the protection of the environment, Ziran zhi you
(Friends of Nature)3.  The years 1995-98 saw frequent journeys to Tibet and led to the
study Tianzang: Xizang de mingyun (Celestial Funeral: The Destiny of Tibet)4. In 1999, he tried
to  explore  the  question  of  Xinjiang  from  the  same  point  of  view,  and  was  briefly
arrested. In 2001, he published Xinjiang zhuiji (Memories of Xinjiang) where he recounts
his misadventures in Urumqi.  Most recently,  Wang had an opportunity to meet the
Dalai Lama and to produce the results of fresh thoughts. In 2001, he created a sensation
by resigning from the Chinese Writers Association 5.
 “Yellow Peril”
5 Yellow Peril,  Wang Lixiong’s  best-known book was  published by  a  Chinese  editor  in
Toronto, Mirror’s Books, in 1991, under the pseudonym Bao Mi (literally: kept secret).
The  novel  was  a  great  success  in  the  Chinese  world  and  was  quickly  published  in
Taiwan. It has not been published in the People’s Republic, but pirate editions circulate
quite widely. It is also distributed in the form of computer diskettes and is available
free of charge on the Internet. The novel is in three volumes and is 1,060 pages long. It
has not been translated into Western languages.
6 The novel’s hero, Shi Ge, is an advisor to the top Chinese leaders, while the country
faces enormous problems: soaring birth-rates, an energy crisis, large-scale corruption,
etc.  Shi  Ge,  aware  of  these  difficulties,  is  tempted  to  turn  away  from  the  path  of
economic  growth  and  imagines  alternative  solutions.  In  this  context  of  crisis,  the
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takes some sensitive measures
including a review of the legal proceedings of the events in Tian’anmen Square in 1989,
and the concession of a province in Manchuria to Japan because of the enormous debt.
In the face of what is perceived as weakness in the leadership, the “hard” wing of the
Party, led by the military, has the General Secretary assassinated and sets up a fascistic
leadership. Shi Ge is now in an alibi position but takes advantage of it to attempt an
experiment  in  development  which  respects  the  environment.  There  follows  the
breakup of the country and civil war, with Taiwan joining the southern provinces. A
nuclear war on a world scale is unleashed.
7 The author  also  imagines  the  emergence  of  a  group which practices  qigong,  and is
transformed  into  a  political  movement.  One  obviously  thinks  of  the  Falungong
phenomenon. Also noticeable is the figure of the intellectual “counsellor to the prince”,
who returns constantly to the forefront of the story. In the Chinese context, one is
tempted to speak of zhinang 6. It is of course very appealing to identify Wang Lixiong
with the character of Shi Ge, who is both the conscience and saviour of humanity, and
is  ready to collaborate with all  sorts  of  regimes—the CCP,  the fascistic  military,  an
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administration set up by the great foreign powers—for the salvation of the people and
of humanity, beyond any short-term considerations of honour or morality.
8 The figure of Shi Ge, of the intellectual as hero, can make us smile, but it is what gives
Yellow Peril its originality and sets it  apart from entertaining “blockbuster” political
fiction.
China and democracy
9 Wang Lixiong clearly favours democratic reforms in his writings. He is the originator of
an “electoral system by stages”. This system is set out in detail in Distribution of Power—
An Electoral System by Stages, which he considers to be his major work. In his Memories of
Xinjiang,  Wang  tells  how,  when  he  was  imprisoned  and  pressured  to  reveal  his
“networks” he considered giving up the idea of  committing suicide,  for fear of  not
being  able  to  carry  out  his  project.  He  nevertheless  attempted  it,  but  fortunately
without success.
10 Wang Lixiong is the webmaster of a site devoted to democracy by stages.  This site,
which is in Chinese only, presents several hundred articles by numerous authors, in
which various democratic systems are presented, and their advantages and drawbacks
listed and evaluated. Some pages are reserved for forums, others for current events.
Wang Lixiong’s Internet site was temporarily closed by the authorities on February
25th 2002. It nevertheless reopened some time later7.  Wang Lixiong gives a succinct
summary of his electoral system in Memories of Xinjiang: “In the structure of an electoral
system by stages,  each module,  each level,  is  autonomous,  there is  no group which
dominates from the top to the bottom, no part crushes any other. Thus all the parts are
inclined to maintain a tolerant and peaceful spirit. Moreover this structure would allow
various  ethnic  groups  to  form.  Within  each  autonomous  body,  none  need  fear
interference, and conflict would have no reason to break out. Each autonomous body
could follow its own principles, spread its culture and protect its members. As for the
exchanges between the autonomous bodies, they would be conducted by the elected
representatives of a higher level of the electoral system by stages.  These high-level
exchanges  would  be  marked  with  reason  and  wisdom  in  compromise.  And  when
enough time had passed, the sources of heterogeneity and separatism would dry up and
society would gradually achieve a state of fusion”.
Environmental protection
11 As can be seen in Yellow Peril, Wang Lixiong is particularly interested in environmental
questions. His descent of the Yellow River on an inflatable raft stems also from this
awareness. Wang Lixiong believes that development that does not take sufficient heed
of these questions is in danger of leading to catastrophe.
12 In 1994, Wang Lixiong took part in the foundation of Ziran zhi you,  the first Chinese
environmentalist NGO. The organisation’s objective is to raise the public’s awareness of
the need for environmental protection. It organises conferences and camps for young
people, and publishes information. It also takes on selective projects, such as saving the
Tibetan antelope. The organisation’s website is a good point of departure for research
into  environmentalist  circles  in  the  People’s  Republic.  However  Wang  Lixiong  was
forced  to  resign  from  Ziran  zhi  you in  February  2003;  it  seems  that  his  disputed
personality prevented the successful working of the organisation8.
The nationalities question—the case of Tibet
13 The nationalities  question has an important  place in  Wang Lixiong’s  activities.  The
major work he has devoted to it is Celestial Funeral: The Destiny of Tibet, a work of 600
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pages, which was published in Hong Kong in 1998 and is also available on the Internet.
The book is the fruit of ten journeys to Tibet, and a total of more than two years spent
living there between 1995 and 1998.
14 The work has not been published, but one can find various sources on the Internet
which present its contents9. Wang’s starting point is the recognition that books about
the Tibetan question generally take the point of view either of Peking or of Dharamsala,
which favours neither dialogue nor the search for a compromise. He therefore seeks a
middle way.  His  thesis  is  that Peking refuses dialogue with the Dalai  Lama for two
reasons:  both parties  have different  geographical  conceptions of  Tibet,  which spills
over into other Chinese provinces,  and Peking cannot tolerate any form of political
organisation  which  escapes  it.  Yet  the  Dalai  Lama’s  demands  no  longer  have  any
grounds,  beyond  these  two  points  in  the  Chinese  view.  So  the  situation  is  one  of
stalemate. As Wang sees it, Peking holds the cards, but the strong are rarely inclined to
make concessions. As for the Dalai Lama, the spiritual nature of his power leaves him
little margin for manœuvre on the political level.
15 In the wake of Celestial Funeral, Wang was invited to Dharamsala by the Dalai Lama. He
did not go, but finally met him in the United States, and in April 2002 published Yu Dalai
Lama duihua (Conversations with the Dalai Lama).
16 In an article which was partly published in translation in the literary supplement of
Courrier International 10 last year, Wang explained the successive stages of Chinese policy
in Tibet: the United Front (preservation of the social and religious system) in the 1950s,
then  collectivisation  and  class  struggle  in  the  1960s,  until  the  end  of  the  Cultural
Revolution.  This  second stage  put  Tibet  in  tune  with  the  rest  of  China,  and  Wang
emphasises  the  violence  of  the  destruction  of  the  monasteries  by  the  Tibetans
themselves,  which  he  explains  as  religious  fervour,  with  Mao  being  a  sort  of  God.
Finally,  since the era of Deng Xiaoping and the end of Maoist ideology, a return to
traditional religion has served to fill the void. This return of the religious is of course
favourable  to  the  Dalai  Lama,  who  is  the  supreme  spiritual  authority  and  the
international symbol of Tibetan identity. As Wang sees it, this policy has improved the
living conditions of Tibetans but has cost the CCP its legitimacy on the high plateaus.
Therefore new solutions need to be found.
The question of Xinjiang
17 Memories  of  Xinjiang was written between February and April  2001,  in Peking. Wang
Lixiong  tells  of  his  journey  to  Xinjiang  in  early  1999.  The  text  is  available  on  the
Internet11 and when printed out comes to fifty-one A4 pages. The first part recounts the
events of Wang Lixiong’s journey: approaches, arrest, interrogations, sufferings, prison,
etc.  The  second  part  is  devoted  to  a  analysis  of  the  situation  in  Xinjiang:  Wang
identifies the problems and tries to imagine a solution. Lastly, the third part of the
book contains  Wang’s  reflections  on the  way in  which he  conceives  his  role  as  an
intellectual.
18 The events which make up the first part of the narrative can be summarised fairly
succinctly. Wang went to Urumqi to make contacts and collect documents in order to
write a book on Xinjiang along the lines of  Celestial  Funeral.  In order to do this,  he
photocopied  an  internal  Party  publication  about  the  Xinjiang  Production  and
Construction Corps, which was classified “Secret”. As he was leaving Xinjiang, with the
intention of returning there the following summer, he was arrested, accused of stealing
state secrets, and interrogated at length. Under pressure to betray his alleged network,
Wang Lixiong, an atypical intellectual
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
4
he attempted suicide by severing his carotid artery. After being hospitalised, he was
imprisoned for several weeks in a detention centre of the Ministry of Security. There he
was able to mix with Uyghur political prisoners with whom he shared a cell, and these
circumstances allowed him to develop his thinking on the question of Xinjiang. Finally,
Wang was mysteriously set free, in exchange for a written promise to help the state if it
became  necessary.  On  his  return  to  Peking,  Wang  was  overcome  with  regret  and
considered this signature to be a betrayal of his own conscience. He therefore wrote to
renege  on his  written promise  and waited  to  be  rearrested.  When this  move went
unanswered, he wrote Memories of Xinjiang in order to make a confession to his readers
and to prove that he did not have any “protection” in high places.
Peking’s policy in Xinjiang
19 Wang Lixiong broaches the question of Xinjiang in the second part of the book. He
begins with the observation that the native population on the one hand, and the Han
on the other, make up, in the single territory of Xinjiang, two distinct and increasingly
antagonistic  communities.  He attributes  all  this  to  three aspects  of  Peking’s  policy:
security,  economics  and  ideology.  The  analysis  of  the  problem  focuses  on  the
government’s policy, which is the only source of action and power. Is Wang Lixiong
addressing the government? Wang has often emphasised the autocratic dimension of
Chinese government, so it is only half surprising that all criticisms are aimed at it.
20 On the level of security policy, Wang Lixiong draws parallels between current notions
and those of the 1960s. In those days the danger was “Soviet revisionism”. Nowadays it
is  “separatist  forces”  as  well  as  “illegal  religious  movements”.  The  fundamental
difference is that the danger, previously of external origin, is now internal. The result
of this policy is to make the native populations of Xinjiang subject to surveillance and
to make the Han in Xinjiang their guards. Wang also contrasts the 1960s—during which
the class struggle relegated ethnic antagonisms to the background—with the present.
He believes that the government’s hard political line can only make it unpopular, all
the more so as the religious antagonisms between the inhabitants of Xinjiang and the
Han are sharper than those between the Han and the Tibetans. Wang is of the opinion
that in the long term, the CCP’s present policy can only lead to an intensification of
these antagonisms, and produce serious crises such as those in the Middle East or in
Chechnya.
21 Wang Lixiong explains the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps12, in which he
sees a source of antagonism between the two communities. He follows this up with an
analysis  of  Peking’s  economic  policy  in  Xinjiang,  of  which  the  key  element  is  the
government’s programme to develop the West13. In this way, in Wang’s analysis, the
government hopes to reduce the differences in wealth. Next, economic development is
supposed to go hand in hand with a  certain secularisation of  society.  Lastly,  Wang
underlines the increase in subsidies granted to Xinjiang by Peking during the 1990s,
making Xinjiang the most generously endowed region in the whole country. Despite
these efforts and the genuine improvement in living standards in Xinjiang in the last
few years, in Wang Lixiong’s eyes this economic policy does not contribute to bringing
the two communities  together. On the contrary,  Wang observes that  this  economic
programme is more beneficial to the Han who have settled in Xinjiang, who are often
more educated, and thus more competitive, and linguistically advantaged for all the
administrative and technical professions. The natives carry out the most unpleasant
jobs. Thus, to the divisions between the communities because of differences of identity
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and culture,  are added the increasing disparities in wealth.  Only a small  influential
minority of Uyghurs,  Kazakhs and others benefit  from this economic policy,  all  the
more  so  as  problems  of  corruption  tend  to  aggravate  the  inequalities,  adds  Wang
Lixiong.
22 After the security and economic policies, Wang Lixiong comments on Peking’s ideology,
and especially nationalism14. In his opinion, ethnic oppression has appeared in Xinjiang
in the last ten years, whereas, before, all were subject to the same political oppression.
Wang believes that nationalistic propaganda can only give the native populations the
feeling  of  being  subjected  to  an  ethnic  oppression  which  is  difficult  to  remedy  by
political  means.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  quarrel  between  the  various  populations
reaches the point of  no return,  political  reforms are more likely to lead the native
populations to  take  advantage  of  the  transition  situation  to  achieve  independence.
Thus  the  nationalist  ideological  policy  hampers  any  attempt  at  political  reform  in
China.  Wang  Lixiong  points  out  that  nationalism  is  a  double-edged  sword  for  the
Chinese government. In the case of China, those who do not identify with the concept
of a “Chinese nation” will be easily tempted to turn nationalist discourse around in
favour of their separatist demands.
23 Wang Lixiong compares the CCP’s policy to an acrobatic performance which is reaching
its outer limit and warns against the consequences of a fall. He finishes by criticising
the  clumsiness  of  the  CCP’s  technocrats,  who  are  not  sufficiently  inspired  by  the
“humanist spirit” 15, which to him is essential in order to take on questions as sensitive
as that of Xinjiang.
The search for a solution
24 Where solutions are concerned, Wang Lixiong provides some broad outlines. He lists
some preliminary conditions, the traps to be avoided, and explains what should not be
done. But he does not offer any concrete plan of action, nor any miraculous political
solutions. His approach consists of defining the problems. It would be more accurate to
speak in terms of a propitious state of mind than of solutions.
25 Wang  Lixiong  recounts  his  simulated  “negotiations”  with  the  Uyghur  political
prisoners who were his cellmates, and served as “representatives” for the occasion. A
number of ideas appear, jumbled together; to Wang, speaking of these negotiations is
an opportunity to list the paths to be avoided. He dismisses extremist solutions and any
resort to terrorism by the populations of Xinjiang, which can only make the problems
worse. He ventures a comparison with the situation in Tibet. According to him, the
pacifist behaviour of the Tibetans has won the sympathy of the young educated Han;
Chinese  bookshops  abound in  publications  on  Tibet  and  some  young  Chinese  even
convert to Lamaism. Mention of Xinjiang, on the other hand, evokes more fear than
sympathy.
26 The other path to be avoided is that of nationalism16 which, to Wang Lixiong, is nothing
but a travesty of Han nationalism, which is experienced as a form of exclusion by part
of the population of Xinjiang. Wang suggests maintaining a certain distance from the
concepts of “nation” and “state”. Finally, Wang and his cellmates agree on the fact that
the  independence  of  Xinjiang  is  inconceivable.  Their  argument  is  that  40%  of  the
population of Xinjiang is Han, and that even without military intervention by Peking,
they would be able to defend themselves by force.
27 In contrast with the problems, which rest on the shoulders of the government, Wang
addresses the solutions to everyone, and particularly to the inhabitants of Xinjiang.
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While it is difficult to influence the security and economic policies of the government,
everyone can cast a critical eye on ideological propaganda. This sheds a new light on
Wang Lixiong’s work: not all solutions necessarily come from on high, and each person
can act at their own level.
28 Wang  Lixiong  concludes  that  the  only  possible  solution  is  real  autonomy.  At  the
moment, Xinjiang is an autonomous province, but its cadres are appointed by Peking.
Xinjiang is in a situation of chronic financial dependence on the central government,
and this administrative structure paralyses any local initiative. As Wang sees it, real
autonomy would be beneficial to both parties. At present, the government is criticised
no  matter  what  it  does.  The  best  solution  is  to  devolve  responsibility  to  the  local
population,  who  are  best  able  to  know  their  own  needs.  The  question  of  natural
resources must obviously give rise to a preliminary agreement, as should compensation
for the regions concerned. Wang wonders how to incorporate the Han in Xinjiang into
the  framework  of  regional  autonomy.  He  seizes  the  opportunity  to  propose  his
“electoral  system by stages”.  The starting point  of  his  thought  is  that  the  existing
political systems are not able to provide a solution to the problems of Xinjiang. So he
agrees with his cellmates that an entirely new solution must be envisaged. They seem
to welcome the system which Wang favours.
29 Wang Lixiong’s approach is to reject ready-made solutions and try to come up with a
new one. Of course, this may seem very vague, even naïve and Utopian, and far from
being entirely novel, it is reminiscent of certain federalist systems. But Wang Lixiong’s
solution is paradoxically redeemed by its vagueness, which guarantees the absence of
solutions  which  conform  to  any  sort  of  orthodoxy,  and  the  way  is  left  open  to
reflection. In his defence, one might also add that in publishing Memories of Xinjiang, he
was  pursuing  another  objective,  related  to  his  arrest.  Wang  analyses  the  relations
between the Han and the Uyghurs and the weaknesses of  Peking’s policy,  which in
China is already a considerable step.
Intentions and methods
30 Wang spells out his intentions at the beginning of Memories of Xinjiang. On the one hand
it is a question of summarising his misfortunes and informing his readers about what
really happened. Wang seeks to convince his readers that he has not “sold out” to the
government.  More  generally  he  also  gives  his  reasons  for  being  interested  in  the
question of nationalities. By his own admission, the prophetic aspects of Yellow Peril
frighten him. To avoid such extremes,  the problem of the nationalities needs to be
resolved in a timely fashion, for its solution is the precondition to any political reform.
It must also be said that the dangers of separatism are frequently invoked to postpone
reforms.
31 In Memories of Xinjiang, Wang Lixiong writes that he has given up fiction in order to
devote himself to studying problems in the field. This is the context of his journey to
Urumqi. Wang explains that he left for Xinjiang at the instigation of a certain Q, who
directs a research centre which is, in his own terms, “outside the system”. Q suggests
that  he  carry  out  research  along  the  same  lines  as  produced  Celestial  Funeral,  and
finances his journey. Wang does not reveal the identity of Q or of his organisation.
32 Wang sets out to establish links with the inhabitants of Xinjiang, both Han and native.
He is accompanied by a friend from the Hui minority, who does not participate in the
research. Wang also seeks to obtain documents on the situation in Xinjiang, but many
of the key documents are internal to the CCP and are not easy to obtain. Wang devotes
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a  whole  paragraph  to  the  problem  of  his  “status”,  of  his  “quality”  (shenfen)  as  a
researcher. Since he has no references from an official research institute, it is difficult
for him to gain access to influential circles. In order to overcome this difficulty, Wang
Lixiong  produces  his  membership  card  of  the  Chinese  Writers  Association.  Wang’s
research  project  is  blocked  by  his  arrest;  however  he  then  has  an  unexpected
opportunity  to  rub  shoulders  with  Uyghur  political  prisoners  in  his  cell  and  takes
advantage of this to approach them, question them and debate with them.
33 The question of  status is  important:  Wang Lixiong is  not a  professional  researcher.
Nowadays, the Chinese intelligentsia is for the most part professionalised. Those who
write in intellectual journals such as Dushu (Reading) and Ershiyi shiji (21st Century) are
usually professors or researchers, in mainland China or abroad. This is not the case
with Wang Lixiong.
34 In  the  last  few  chapters,  Wang  Lixiong  begins  to  think  about  the  impact  of  his
wanderings  in  Xinjiang.  The  reasons  for  his  sudden  release  remain  unclear,  even
though he mentions several possibilities. First of all, news of his arrest was believed to
have  caused  a  wave  of  indignation  abroad,  and  Peking  is  careful  to  protect  its
reputation. It turns out also that his mother and stepfather wrote to Jiang Zemin; Wang
Lixiong’s father was once Jiang Zemin’s superior in an car factory in Changchun17.
35 Wang finds two things unbearable: the idea that the public might think that his release
was  due  to  “protection”  inside  the  political  apparatus;  and  his  written  promise  to
collaborate with the government if necessary, which left him with the impression of
having been freed in order to become a lackey. So he decides to take back his promise
in writing, even if it means returning to prison. He writes a letter first to Jiang Zemin,
and when this remains unanswered, he writes a second one to the Office of Security in
Urumqi, which also produces no answer and has no consequences. His written promise
makes him despair, for it seems administratively irrevocable, and he thinks that it will
forever cut him off from the government: if the government consulted him, he would
have the impression of answering on the basis of this promise which was made under
constraint, and he would be forced to refuse.
36 In this context, Wang mentions the Falungong affair, during which he was discreetly
consulted by a security officer who promised to relay his opinion to the top through
rapid channels. Wang Lixiong explains that he refused to express his opinion because
he felt bound by the famous letter. And yet he is convinced that no collaboration with
the government should be taboo, as long as it is freely given, and regrets that he was
unable  to  contribute,  however  modestly,  to  the  resolution  of  the  Falungong  affair,
which in his opinion was dealt with clumsily by the government.
37 Wang Lixiong also relies on the impact attributed by some to Yellow Peril in the West:
the novel is said to have led to a change in attitude in the West towards the CCP. Wang
says he is ready to work more closely with the CCP. He is convinced that China is on the
edge of a precipice, and he will stop at nothing to prevent it falling over. His aim is not
to come to the rescue of the CCP which is, he asserts, the major cause of the present
situation. Wang Lixiong believes that the best solution would be for the CCP to reform
itself, which, as he recognises, is unlikely to happen. He concludes Memories of Xinjiang
in these terms: “Thinking over what happened to me in Xinjiang, time and distance
allow me now to transcend the inital  feelings and suffering, and I  am beginning to
realise the depth of what I gained from it. This led me to reflect deep inside in the
course of this struggle for dignity, which made possible the rejection of dependence on
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the government to become consciousness; I was able to experience the feelings of the
national minorities by putting myself in their place, and sweep away once and for all
the  last  vestiges  of  nationalism  which  remained  in  me;  I  understood  by  personal
experience  the  weakness  of  human  nature,  and  I  have  since  become  all  the  more
tolerant  of  fear  and submissiveness  and I  abhor autocratic  tyranny twice  as  much.
Having walked the frontier between life and death makes it possible for me to adapt to
any situation; the courage I begged God to give me then, has since penetrated my soul,
silently, like the rain which makes the earth fruitful. I do not believe that I will never
again show weakness, but I will certainly be less subject to fear, I will be stronger, I will
go out to meet the evil whose arrogance threatens our world, with a more courageous
attitude”.
38 Wang Lixiong’s intentions appear clearly here. Recounting what happened to him in
Xinjiang was necessary in order to carry out his mission as an intellectual—both man of
letters and hero—concerned to work for the good of the people, at the risk of lacking in
modesty in the role of saviour of humanity.
The heroism of the man of letters
39 A study of Memories of Xinjiang shows both Wang Lixiong’s working methods and the
limits imposed by the political environment characteristic of mainland China. Wang is
highly critical of the Chinese government and of the CCP. How is it that his activities
are nonetheless tolerated? Another contemporary Chinese intellectual,  Liu Xiaobo18,
explains in an article entiled “China: the grey areas of freedom” that censorship is far
from having disappeared in mainland China. He points to several websites which have
been closed out of hand, among them the one masterminded by Wang Lixiong. For all
that,  Liu  continues,  today’s  China  is  no  longer  that  of  Mao,  and  peremptory
revolutionary statements are no longer sufficient to justify a condemnation. With the
opening up of the economy, the Chinese leadership has to make efforts to be appealing
in  order  to  attract  Western  investors  and  are  obliged  to  behave  in  a  more  subtle
manner.  The  new  ways  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  take  the  form  of  threats  of
dismissal  for  those  who have  a  more  or  less  official  job,  the  suspension of  certain
classes for those who teach, a ban on publishing, etc. However Liu Xiaobo observes that
once they have reached a certain level  of  renown, intellectuals  can generally allow
themselves a margin of criticism of the government, as long as it is not a direct and
personal attack. In Liu’s eyes, the present government’s priority is economic growth,
and the obsession with profit has weakened the administrative structures all the way
up to the censorship organs, whose laxity is evident. Rather than a liberalisation, the
grey areas of freedom are the symptoms of profound decay. 
40 This analysis  sheds light on the case of  Wang Lixiong.  Censorship exists,  but Wang
Lixiong  nonetheless  finds  ways  to  express  himself.  His  situation  is  precarious:  his
website was closed down for some time, his books are not published in China, he was
imprisoned for a month in Xinjiang, and forced to resign from Ziran zhi you. But Wang
Lixiong  is  careful  not  to  go  beyond  certain  boundaries.  While  he  questions  the
legitimacy of a government which he constantly describes as “autocratic”, his activity
is  not  directly  subversive,  he  is  even  ready  to  collaborate  as  a  zhinang with  the
government,  should it  be necessary.  Wang does not attack anyone in particular,  he
merely points to the political errors of the CCP. He starts debates, but he could not be
described as a political activist. Moreover he is not a threat to Peking inasmuch as,
although he addresses a fairly wide audience, he does not have any powerful means of
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influence.  The  number  of  articles  available  on  his  website  is  indeed  impressive.
However  his  audience  is  probably  limited  to  those  who  are  interested  in  specific
problems,  and are  mostly  resident  abroad.  Lastly,  in  contrast  to  other  professional
intellectuals,  Wang  Lixiong  does  not  have  any  official  or  semi-official  post.  This
unquestionably  leaves  him  greater  freedom,  for  his  independence  reduces  the
possibilites for pressure to be brought to bear on him. Despite the virtually total lack of
translations of his work, Wang Lixiong enjoys a certain prestige abroad, mostly thanks
to the overseas Chinese. This aura does of course have a protective effect. When he was
imprisoned in Xinjiang, the protests from abroad very probably had an impact. It is
probably  more  to  Peking’s  advantage  to  attract  the  favours  of  the  West  than  to
persecute a  spoilsport  when he knows how to lie  low.  Nevertheless,  the “freedom”
enjoyed by Wang Lixiong remains precarious and highly relative.
41 Wang  Lixiong’s  intellectual  work  is  original.  In  Memories  of  Xinjiang, he  judiciously
analyses Peking’s policy in Xinjiang. His methods, however, are atypical. Firstly he does
not  have  the  profile  of  a  dissident.  Despite  the  difficulties he  encounters,  and  the
opportunities he has to travel abroad, Wang carries on his activities within China itself.
Nor does he seek to overthrow the government, or impose Western-style democracy,
which he does not seem to consider applicable to the realities in China. Wang even
declares that he is ready to collaborate with the government. He merely wishes that the
power of the CCP would dissolve itself, which after all corresponds to the objectives of
Communism, which is supposed to lead to the disappearance of the state. 
42 Secondly, Wang Lixiong does not fit the profile of the reforming intellectual within the
Party or inside the system. The criticisms he aims at the government are virulent, and
he  strongly  emphasises  his  quality  as  an  independent  intellectual.  He  is  neither  a
researcher in an institute, nor a journalist, nor a professor in a university, and thus
neither “official” nor “semi-official”. He relies only on himself and his connections, and
carefully avoids any “immoral” collaboration with the government.
43 Thirdly, Wang Lixiong differs from many intellectuals in the fact that his intellectual
work does not make any claims to scientific rigour. It would be tempting to compare
Wang Lixiong’s case with that of Liu Xiaobo and other “liberal” intellectuals, who are
neither dissidents nor reformers within the system, but this  proves impossible.  Liu
Xiaobo,  a  former  professor  of  philosophy19,  refers  to  Western philosophers  such as
Nietzsche,  to  question  the  meaning  of  Chinese  modernity.  Wang  Lixiong’s
preoccupations are much more concrete. When he analyses Peking’s policy in Xinjiang,
Wang quotes some statistical data, and a few leader’s phrases, but goes no further in
terms of references. Wang Lixiong does not base himself on publications in political
science or in ethnology, but goes out in the field and relies on his impressions. The
same can be observed in the political system which Wang Lixiong conceives. This is
Utopian, in the best sense of the word, because it seems unrealisable and because it is a
question of an imaginary ideal government. In Memories of Xinjiang the subject is “the
humanist spirit”, which he sees as lacking in technocratic officials. To Wang Lixiong,
the humanist spirit comes before scientific rigour.
44 As well  as these three observations which give Wang Lixiong’s intellectual work its
atypcical character, one must emphasise the heroic conception he has of his own role
as a man of letters. This already appears in Yellow Peril, a work of the author’s early
period, but it is still apparent in a later work such as Memories of Xinjiang. The heroism
of the man of letters is one of the fundamental characteristics of the literature which
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sprang from the May 4th movement, as Ezra Vogel points out20. This heroism of Wang
Lixiong’s is paradoxical. On the one hand, Wang’s aspirations to the function of zhinang
show him in  a  pretentious  light;  on  the  other,  the  archaic  character  of  his  heroic
attitude  make  him  seem  like  an  amateur.  Despite  this,  Wang  subtly  analyses  the
problems of contemporary China and asks judicious questions. He recounts this in an
agreeable  manner which is  accessible  to  a  wide audience,  thus carrying the debate
beyond the overly narrow circle of specialists. Therein lies his greatest quality.
NOTES
1. See www.dijin-democracy.net
2. Bao Mi, Huanghuo, Fengyun shidai chuban, Taipei, 1991; can be downloaded at 
www8800.8800.org/book/wh/hh.html.
3. See www.fon.org.cn.
4. Wang Lixiong, Tianzang: Xizang de mingyun, Mingjing chubanshe, Hong Kong, 1998;
can be downloaded at http://members.lycos.co.uk/chinatown/Theme/China/
nation.htm.
5. Wang Lixiong resigned from the Association in May 2001. In his statement he said :
“[…] It is no longer acquiescence which is demanded, but the annihilation of the whole
personality, of all conscience and of all individual pride, in order to make crouching
dogs of us. To continue to belong to this organisation is not an honour, it is on the
contrary the shame of any writer worthy of the name”. Cf. Chen Yan, L’Eveil de la
Chine, La Tour d’Aigues, L’Aube, 2002, p. 287
6. Zhinang, literally “bag of wisdom”, a term which traditionally designates a man of
resources, who puts his knowledge at the disposal of the government, an “advisor to
the Prince”.
7. See Liu Xiaobo, “Chine: les zones grises de la liberté”, Politique internationale, No 96,
2002, p. 331.
8. See the Human Rights Watch Report, 2003. It states that Wang Lixiong was forced to
resign from the organisation, which would otherwise run the risk of having its right to
operate withdrawn.
9. See www.future-china.org.tw/fcn/pr/wlx.htm
10. See the supplement of Courrier International No. 629, Nov. 2002. The article was
first published in the Peking journal Zhanlüe yu guanli; disgusted with the cuts made in
the original text, Wang Lixiong put the whole text on the Internet. The British journal
New Left Review translated and published it.
11. See www.chinasite.com/content/Politics/XinJiangStory.htm
12. According to an article in the People’s Daily on May 26th 2003, the XPCC has 2.4
million members, of whom 90% are Han, among them 933,000 workers on the job. See 
http://fpfre.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/26/fre20030526_61165.html 
13. “Open up the West” (Xibu da kaifa) is a government development action
programme aimed at stimulating the economy of the mainland regions in order to
Wang Lixiong, an atypical intellectual
China Perspectives, 50 | november- december 2003
11
reduce the prosperity and industrialisation differentials between the coastal regions in
the East and the inland regions in the West.
14. In modern Chinese two different words are translated as “nationalism”. Here Wang
Lixiong uses minzu zhuyi, from minzu, the nation or the people, which can be
translated as “ethnic nationalism”. Further on in the text Wang Lixiong uses the word
guojia zhuyi, from guojia, the state, which we could translate as “state nationalism”. In
the case of the USSR, the two words referred respectively to Russian nationalism and to
Soviet nationalism. Marie-Claude Bergère reminds us that the origins of Chinese
nationalism are linked to the anti-Manchu movements: China had to free itself from the
yoke of the barbarians and become Chinese once again, which implies that the Manchus
were not really Chinese and that Chinese nationalism is a Han ethnic nationalism. See
Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, Fayard, Paris, 1994, pp. 178-84. These problems of
linguistic ambiguity make it possible to understand more clearly Wang Lixiong’s
thoughts on the impact of nationalism in Xinjiang. The concept of a “Chinese nation”—
in Chinese Zhonghua minzu—is all the more ambiguous. 
15. Renwen jingshen, “the spirit of culture and of man”, a concept which appeared in
Chinese intellectual circles in the 1990s, and was the object of lively debate between
1993 and 1995. Chen Yan speaks of a Chinese humanist spirit which is in opposition
both to religion—or official ideology—and to the “ordinary”, not to say immoral spirit,
which is the essence of the market economy. See Chen Yan, L’Eveil de la Chine, op. cit., p.
144. Zhang Lun speaks of a concept which has never been clearly defined, but which
refers to the idea of spirituality, metaphysical thought and an interest in culture. See
Zhang Lun, La Vie intellectuelle en Chine depuis la mort de Mao, Fayard, Paris, 2003, p. 235.
16. This time Wang Lixiong is speaking of guojia zhuyi, see note 14.
17. At least according to rumour. See an article in the China Times of Taipei at http://
www.rolandli.com/goods/wlx/wlx.htm. Wang Lixiong’s father, Wang Shaolin, was a
fellow student of Jiang Zemin’s and was his superior in the 1950s. The two families are
said to be quite close. Wang Shaolin was persecuted to death during the Cultural
Revolution.
18. Former professor of philosophy at the University of Peking. An active member of
the Democratic Movement in 1989, he was sentenced to three years of reeducation by
labour in 1996, for having called for the self-determination of Tibet. Released on
October 7th 1999, he still lives in Peking and publishes on the Internet, as well as in
various journals in Hong Kong and in the Chinese diaspora. See Liu Xiaobo, “Chine : les
zones grises de la liberté”, in Politique internationale, No 96, 2002, pp. 331-47.
19. For a complete study of Liu Xiaobo’s intellectual output, see Jens Damm, Liu Xiaobo–
Ein moderner Ikonoklast in der Tradition des Vierten-Mai, M.A. dissertation in Sinology,
University of Treviso, 1994: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jensdamm/pdf/mag.pdf. 
20. See Ezra F. Vogel, “The Unlikely Heroes: The Social Role of the May Fourth Writers”,
in Merle Goldman ed., Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (USA) and London, 1977, pp. 145-59.
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